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SOLIDARITY -  
ENLIGHTENED LEADERSHIP 
Ignace Haaz, Switzerland/Hungary 
12.1 Solidarity: as an End or as a Means? 
12.1.1 Solidarity as an End 
Solidarity could be defined in the broad sense either as a means or as 
an end. Considered as an end, solidarity is the motive of any virtuous 
action based on altruistic reasons, such as helping others to rescue 
someone in order to prevent a harmful situation. E. g. contributing to lift 
and rescue a heavy person, lying unconscious in the street on the floor, 
who is being handled by rescuers, but who might be needing an addi-
tional person, could express the value of solidarity as an end, since an 
answer to others request for help is given in the situation of emergency 
and risk, without having a particular obligation to help139.  
12.1.2 Solidarity as a Means 
As a means (to an end, not an end), solidarity could be understood as 
a property of dependency of a set of parts to a whole (in solidum), as 
when in a family or a professional group, individual and collective roles 
and responsibilities are melt together to some extent. This idea of bene-
fiting others could be understood either as a way of sharing together 
                                                          
139 Haaz, I. (2012): La solidarité, Paris: L’Harmattan—see on the duty to help 
and the Harm Principle Part III, 275 ff. and 291. 
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moral sentiments as love, social virtues as friendship and shared com-
mitments and common economic and educational interests, in a limited 
community circle, that of the family. Even if the division of labour is not 
simply based on patriarchal authority, mutual consent of family mem-
bers to rules and to a commune circle of interests, those of the family, 
resemble to a egoism of the group, and not yet to truly social and altruis-
tic values. Solidarity as cohesion of human beings, by the means of “in-
terchangeability of ideas, services, goods, of workforce, virtues and vic-
es”, is solidarity limited to the constitution of a process of exchange that 
is a means that could be used to different ends. Work in itself may be 
seen as an ideal means to integrate human beings in society and there-
fore is a powerful tool in order to achieve mutual benefice from a social 
and an economical order. As team work at the work place, that would 
complement a simple division of the labour is another manifestation of 
solidarity, when individuals are asked to work in groups, provided a 
transparent collaborative participation in a process of production of eco-
nomic value. In many professional sectors there could be larger notions 
of solidarity, as a means of assigning direction lines, soft laws and crea-
tion of global norms, intended to counterbalance the strictly juridical, 
and economical notions of the work, entrepreneurship and economical 
organization (e. g. corporate governance and ethics140). In the sector of 
research, sharing research benefits is based on the awareness of the co-
incidence of individual and collective ends and strategies to accord indi-
vidual potentials to constant evolutions, from the changes experimented 
in the society, technology and the continuous constructive production of 
science knowledge in a global world. In the military sector it is easy to 
represent solidarity as means, since soldiers’ actions express solidarity 
on daily basis, the victory of those on the front sign the victory of those 
                                                          
140 A very useful work on the aspect of solidarity as an integrated notion, related 
to both subjective and objective relative dimensions, see: Edison Paul Tabra 
Ochoa: Solidarity y gobierno corporativo de la empresa, Bosch Editor, 2015, 
66ff. 
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resting behind the combat front: thus all soldiers accept a duty of loyalty 
and solidarity to the group, which might extend to self-sacrifice for vic-
tory.  
12.1.3 Dependency, Transparency and Self-Empowerment 
Although a libertarian notion of freedom as essentially negative 
freedom would be strongly opposed to solidarity as dependency or het-
eronomy, we will see that it is far from clear that dependency and a cer-
tain level of authority or nudging should be seen as essentially negative. 
Solidarity as a means is a protective convention to preserve important 
subjective interests, in this sense it might be defined as rule-from-
another or a principle based on heteronomy as opposed to rule-from-
oneself, when a human being is searching for self-realization in “the 
authority of the family, the clan, State legislation, the morals, the Church 
or the divine will141”. A secular ethical point of view focusing on auton-
omy and negative freedom should be moderated by the possibility of 
fruitful and constructive relation between theonomous realism of values, 
- that is a point of view based on religious beliefs or self-transcendence -
, and autonomous realist view of values. Thus we think that theonomy 
should not be seen as heteronomous per se, since it may not be consid-
ered as contrary to an increase self-empowerment. There is a difference 
saying that by a principle based in heteronomy, some dependency is 
accepted and that some principle is accepted from an external authority, 
without the capacity to be recognized as true principle by the person, if 
any other option of enlightened moral choice would be given, in the 
development of his autonomous ethical and moral consciousness. Fami-
ly members might not need to build their choice only in reaction to the 
                                                          
141 Similar secular libertarian point of view is expressed by not only E. v. Hart-
mann, but also many Neo-Kantian philosophers, influenced by Kant’s notion of 
autonomy. See: König, Hermann (1910): Die Metaphysische Begründung der 
Ethik in Eduard von Hartmanns Philosophischem System, Verlag von Quelle & 
Meyer in Leipzig, 15. 
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determining power of others, - as often small children do - they might in 
a second stage of development of ethical and social capacities ground a 
choice on a proper critical self-evaluation. When a person is reflecting 
on motivations for actions, or on the normative principles to act, found 
in some altruistic values, the value is not an exterior value. Autonomy is 
therefore understood in different other context than as founding true 
moral ethical principles. Not only independence from coercive or ma-
nipulative influences is essential for the autonomy and the flourishing of 
various capabilities of the self. As well the individual’s capacity for self-
control and reflective authenticity are key conditions to increase self-
empowerment142. Interestingly this notion of self-mastering doesn’t en-
tail that a certain degree of its contrary would automatically be wrong. It 
is unclear if, in all cases, an opaque non-coercive influence may be seen 
as preferable to more transparent but more coercive efforts. The value 
of non-coerciveness hinges on the libertarian presupposition of founding 
the value of freedom on negative conceptions of freedom as the absence 
of any obstacle. As a result, it may not hold across all conceptions of 
freedom143. Solidarity as system of dependency may want to but a con-
siderable weight on transparency, instead of institutional and individual 
autonomy. Two valuable contributions have been made in that direction: 
first the initiative of a Global Compact that entails a duty to report, and 
thus open to transparent activity self-interpretation, the second is the 
proposition to organize deliberative ideal communities, where solidarity 
would be given by a principle of universality of the morality of the dis-
course.  
                                                          
142 As expressed by Dworkin, G. (1988), The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-32. Also see: Raz, J. (1986): The 
Morality of Freedom: Oxford: Clarendon. 
143 See the brilliant analysis by Chris Mill, in: Heteronomy of Choice Architec-
ture, 2015, preprint URL: https://ucl.academia.edu/ChrisMills 
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12.1.4 Some Considerations on the Value of Transparency 
The UN Global Compact (UNGC) is an important example of a great 
step forward towards more transparency in solidarity in the organization 
of an enterprise and in research institutions. Without necessarily asking 
for a clear evaluation of the intention of the promise, inherent to any 
shared consent toward a compact, or even specifying in defined terms 
the finality of solidarity as such, the model of the Global Compact (GC), 
initiated by the Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan in 1999, has 
widely been accepted as a model of soft law, in particular in the field of 
the social responsibility of enterprises. As governing tool this duty could 
be seen as a purely self-communicative and self-explanatory require-
ment to report on regular basis, on the activities of any type of organiza-
tion (an NGO, an enterprise, an academic institution, etc.).144 This com-
pact of solidarity, based on a retrospective report of activities may be 
seen as lacking a prospective temporal aspect: in order to produce a 
meaningful description of activities, on the model of a promise, one 
would need to present objectives that are not yet realized (you cannot 
promise that you haven’t broken a plate145). A purely discursive justifi-
cation of ethical standards and valuable goals, where the object of the 
promise cannot be transcribed in a coherent and delimited description of 
facts, but to processes, that relate less to assignable responsibilities than 
a model of governance by the real, instead of the real. The repetitive 
character of the report is the contrary of a punctual analysis based on the 
recognition of value driven goals. Self-developing process may be 
transparent, because the rationale of the process would be clear. Simply 
by communicating, the organization might already justify the imperative 
to be responsible, if the promise is not motivated by the true or a false 
                                                          
144 Thomas Berns / Gaëlle Jeanmart, “Le rapport comme réponse de l’entreprise 
responsable : promesse ou aveu (à partir d’Austin et Foucault)”, Dissensus, Dos-
sier : Droit et philosophie du langage ordinaire, N° 3 (2010), URL : 
http://popups.ulg.ac.be/2031-4981/index.php?id=701. 
145 Berns/Jeanmart, “ 1er problème le rapport au temps ”, ibid. 
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description of an inner experience, but not the simple act of speech (with 
J. L. Austin, 1962), and not without a sincere motivations of the self146. 
The moral principle of the discourse ethics could be a second way of 
conceiving communication and solidarity.  
12.1.5 Solidarity as Discourse Ethical Principle  
Jürgen Habermas has famously built his notion of solidarity on a 
universal principle that has a moral dimension, embedded in the idea of 
a discursive process, where parties would share a same arena of public 
deliberation and discursive will-formation, provided that morally re-
sponsible agents be present, who would have a recognizable capacity to 
assert legal right claims. The original solution of the philosopher is to 
present a creative tension: between the facts and the norms, between the 
descriptive level of solidarity, as concrete reality, and the normative 
solidarity that count as an ought statement. The concept of justice which 
would originate from an ideal community, linked into the practice of 
communication, entails an awareness of solidarity, as certainty of close 
union in a common life context. But it is precisely this foundation on the 
universality of morals that renders solidarity still not easy to use in the 
proposition of the moral principle of communication147. This view of 
communication in a given cultural community can help us to introduce 
the question whether self-development that is based in a communicative 
praxis, might not need to be transcribed in an agency-based process, so 
that we could introduce leadership in relation to solidarity, as what helps 
people to enable others.  
                                                          
146 Austin, J. L. (1962), How to Do Things with Words, 2nd edn., M. Sbisà and J. 
O. Urmson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. 
147 Habermas, J. (1981): Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp. English trans., 1984a, 1987. See : Pensky, M. (2008) The Ends 
of Solidarity: Discourse Theory in Ethics and Politics, New York: SUNY, Ch. 1. 
Derpmann, Simon (2013) : Gründe der Solidarität, 223pp. Ethica Band 22, 
Münster: Mentis. 
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12.2 The Enlightened Leadership: Helping Others 
to Develop their Own Capacities 
The aim of enabling others to transcend their horizon of action, in 
the possibility of an ongoing human flourishing, is a definition of lead-
ership based on freedom and some shared basic preferences, in order to 
have a good life. The capability approach highlights that freedom to 
achieve well-being is a matter of what people are able to do, and thus the 
kind of life they are able to lead. We don’t need here to go much in de-
tails on the nature of a compact, a scheme of communication, a social 
contract, or a supposed natural law based explanation on the reason for 
people to all have overall similar social interests. To act as enabler sup-
poses to take a situation of just collaboration and focus on the capacity 
of agency in a given cultural community, instead of seeing an autono-
mous development only as a capacity of autonomous evaluation148. In 
order to shift from the essential properties of self-development, as an 
autonomous process as we just saw it above, to an agency-based devel-
opment, and introduce leadership in relation to solidarity, as what helps 
people to enable others, following a view expressed by Sen, we just 
need to suppose some basic capabilities that external dependencies such 
as “exclusion, poverty, powerlessness, exploitation, and a lack of things 
such as education, health and food, which increase people’s spiritual and 
material capability, can deprive people of such ability149”.  
In consequence, we could transcribe solidarity as means in the form 
of any mediating and communicative activity, enabling others to spiritu-
                                                          
148 As example we might mention that for Hugo Grotius (Grotius, De Jure Belli 
et Pacis) it is only by mastering language and rational understanding that an 
essential structure of ethical and juridical norms of solidarity and justice could 
be developed, from the simplest social instincts. 
149Symphorien Ntibagirirwa (2014): Philosophical Premises for African Eco-
nomic Development: Sen’s Capability Approach, Geneva: Globethics.net Theses 
No. 7, p. 290. See Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom, New York: Knopf, 
pp. 87ff & 137ff. 
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al and material capability, by the medium of protective systems and 
networks, where individuals or groups can expect to conserve collabora-
tive activities, in a peaceful and sustainable way (e. g. cultural commu-
nities, professional corporations, professional associations, online tools 
developed to make joint research activities within a scientific communi-
ty). The description of solidarity as an end, constitute a normative sys-
tem that could help and motivates us, for behaviour that has its object 
the benefit of others, enable or empower others to act, and therefore 
conceive others as persons in action. An acceptable duty or will to “act 
in consideration of the interests of other persons, without the need of 
ulterior motives150”, is essential in order to reject a purely prudential 
reason to follow social behaviours. Enabling others would require acting 
on someone else’s behalf [...], and whose achievements are to be as-
sessed in the light of someone else’s goals151”. Secondly, agent refers to 
“someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements 
can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives152”. In order to 
propose to others protection that would benefit them supposes to raise 
the issue of hard paternalism that is solidarity essentially as a means not 
an end. Leaders should not intend to promote the well-being of the sub-
ject because he or she is judged incapable of doing so themselves. The 
internal point of view on the value of altruism and solidarity vs. the ex-
ternal (naturalistic, prudential) point of view should be explained in or-
der to clarify the teleological understanding of the norm of solidarity 
from a subjective realist point of view. The assurance of my proper in-
tegrity (that I respect myself and others) in helping others supposes that 
I know which value I put in action. We will see now that the realist view 
on values should not be historical, nor hermeneutical or a natural view. 
                                                          
150 Nagel, Thomas (1978): The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton New Jersey : 
Princeton UP, 79. 
151 Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom, op. cite, 18-19. 
152 Sen, ibid. Ntibagirirwa, 2014, p. 289. 
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12.3 Reconsidering the Importance of Solidarity 
as an End 
The word “solidarity” doesn’t express a simple philosophical con-
cept; therefore, solidarity should be analyzed and defined in more simple 
terms, by breaking down a straight forward explanation such as: soli-
darity is a fundamental human drive “to move with others” (Dilthey, 
1965153). In order to understand what the philosopher means by such a 
basic anthropological capacity to move with others, and ask us the ques-
tion of the moral dimensions of this anthropological basis of solidarity, 
that would be rooted in an internal point of view on values, as opposed 
to an external explanation. In order to describe this internal understand-
ing of solidarity let’s first defined the composed characteristics of soli-
darity, by listing them as parts of the complete definition, that includes 
external points of views, and then, by taking a look at the relationships 
between the internal and external parts. A philosophical analysis should 
show us the beliefs and motivations surrounding the truth of moral 
statements and reasons to act in an altruistic way by reflecting on the 
notion of life as either a biological or anthropological substratum. 
12.3.1 Biocentric and Vitalist Solidarities 
The philosophical psychology of solidarity, has been developed by 
first stating a natural ground in some altruistic behaviours, as “physical 
altruism of the lowest kind”, which, “differentiating from physical ego-
ism, may, in this case, be considered as not yet independent of it”, as 
when “whatever action, unconscious or conscious, involves expenditure 
of individual life to the end of increasing life in other individuals” 
(Spencer, 1879/1902, 232154). Secondly, defined as “automatically psy-
                                                          
153 A basic anthropological ‘Mitbewegung’. Dilthey, W. (1965): System der 
Ethik, H. Nohl (ed.), Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. X, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 74-77. 
154 Spencer, Herbert (1879/1902) : Data of Ethics, New York: P.F. Collier & 
Son. 
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chical” altruism, solidarity could be considered in situations where al-
most conscious altruism is present: as in birds and mammals, and in pa-
rental activities, guided by instinct, where such activities are accompa-
nied by either no representations or by vague representations of the ben-
efits which is received (284). Self-sacrifice, then could be recognized as 
“no less primordial than self-preservation. Being in its simple physical 
form absolutely necessary for the continuance of life from the begin-
ning; and being extended under its automatic form” (ibid, 235).  
12.3.2 The Inner Life as the Realistic View on Values 
Another perspective might be introduced at this point, we find it by 
E. v. Hartmann as an important part of his Ethics of the Moral Senti-
ments155, where we have the affirmation that the moral sentiment of sol-
idarity should not be reduced to a vital value in a biocentric way such as 
being part of natural selection and evolution or in a conative principle 
(as life explained as a general principle of will to live). If solidarity is 
not only related to the theory of evolution with Spencer (see also Fouil-
lée, Guyau), but as well from outside a vitalist principle in ethics, in 
order not to reduce some of the most important values as Love, Sympa-
thy and the tendency for religious devotion to egoistical tendencies con-
ditioned by life as growth, power and domination in the struggle to sur-
vive and self-preservation. Interestingly, even biocentered philosophers 
such as Spencer, recognized the importance to turn upside down the 
system based on evolution where the sentiment of altruism originated 
from egoism, when he affirmed that an “originated community building” 
constitute the current inclination of methodological individualism156.  
“If we define altruism as being all action which, in the normal course of 
things, benefits others instead of benefiting self, then, from the dawn of 
life, altruism has been no less essential than egoism. Though, primarily, 
                                                          
155 Von Hartmann, Eduard (1879/2006): Die Gefühlsmoral, 5. Das Moralprinzip 
des Geselligkeitstriebes, Hamburg : Meiner Verl., 80-85.  
156 Spencer, Data of Ethics, Altruism versus Egoism, Ch. XII, §76, 232. 
Solidarity – Enlightened Leadership  173 
 
 
it is dependent on egoism, yet, secondarily, egoism is dependent on it”). 
Scheler names the “Principle of Solidarity”, the essential experience of 
human community, in which an anthropologically centered understand-
ing of life is founded, as essentially independent from this first organic 
drive to survive proposed by Spencer157. We have seen above that in 
order to grasp altruism and solidarity as inner perception of values, we 
don’t even need to draw a relation to organic, historical or hermeneutical 
aspects, only to true reason for being persuaded to act in a way to benefit 
others. Let’s suppose now that no such realist account exist, as though 
experiment.  
12.3.3 Solidarity and the Radical Contingency of the Notion of Justice 
Richard Rorty defines the radical contingency of any norm of justice, 
and of any social relation, that is understood as related to his denial of 
any universal solidarity, because Rorty takes for questionable the condi-
tions of foundation of such a universal solidarity. Once we took the first 
step and acknowledged the contingency of any possible bridge built 
toward human differences, we tend to accept in a second step the ordi-
nariness of ordinary vices: the supposed normal badness that seems  
acceptable. After that both steps, we may find ourselves not so distant 
from the moral monsters of human history, as Shklar rightly demonstrat-
ed, in her Ordinary Vices (1985158) full of wit, but not without letting us 
perplex on any common ground for solidarity. We agree on Derpmann 
criticism of Rorty, because he sees a lack entailed by this radical contin-
gency: in that Rorty’s presupposition of the radical contingency of the 
                                                          
157 Scheler, Max (1916/2000): Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die material 
Wertethik, Materiale Wertethik un Eudaimonimus, Bonn: Bouvier Verl. 284 note 
I. 
158 Ordinary vices” distinct from the seven capital sins, are cruelty, hypocrisy, 
snobbery, betrayal, and misanthropy for Judith Shlar, they are merely forms of 
inhumanity. As Nietzsche reminds us, no great religion or art could be possible 
without cruelty, and even more: no new social order of moral rules is plausible 
without this constitutional and ordinary vice. Shklar, J. (1985): Ordinary Vices, 
Harvard UP: Belknap Press. 
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relations of the members of a given community fails to explain 
the possibility and condition of delimitation of true forms of solidarity 
from totalitarian prototypes of same. Normative solidarity is distinct 
from the simplifying ideologies in that, even if both could well be 
harmless, only a true solidarity has the value of sharing in the communi-
ty, while an ideological solidarity could not be understood as a moral 
expectation, toward the possibility to empower others, beyond  
the relation of membership of the participants of a community. 
 
